Self-Knowledge Via Inner Observation of External Objects?

Author: A. Brueckner1

Source: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 81, Number 1, March 01, 2003 , pp. 118-122(5)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

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Abstract:

Harold Langsam has recently presented a novel observational account of self-knowledge. I critically discuss this account and argue that it fails to provide a uniform understanding of how we are able to know the contents of our own thoughts.

Document Type: Discussion

Affiliations: 1: University of California, Santa Barbara

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