True Colours, False Theories

Author: V. Arstila

Source: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 81, Number 1, March 01, 2003 , pp. 41-50(10)

Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

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Abstract:

The question of the constituting nature of colour is largely open. The old dispute between colour objectivism and colour subjectivism is still relevant. The former has defended itself against accusations of not being able to explain colour structures, while the latter view has received criticism for not being able to provide a plausible theory of the location of colours. By weakening the notion of physical categories, making some of them perceiver-depended, colour objectivists have managed to overcome at least some of the previous accusations. However, the arguments based on Crane's and Piantanida's findings of the existence of binary colours like greenish-red and yellowish-blue, indicate the inadequacy of colour objectivism. Consequently, we have colours but our theories of them are false.

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: University of Turku, Finland

Publication date: 2003-03-01