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Bruce Benjamin (1925–1963)
Man and mechanism 1 Earlier versions of this paper were read before the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association at St. Louis and the Australasian Conference at Canberra in 1961.
Are there any incorrigible empirical statements? 1 There is an excellent discussion of this question in A. J. Ayer's The Problem of Knowledge , Chapter 2, Sections (iv), (v), and (vi), which mentions almost all the relevant considerations. However, it seems to me to stress some of the less important points and merely to mention what I regard as the crucial argument. I refer to this discussion by the pages in the Pelican edition. The case against incorrigibility is argued also by J. L. Austin (against John Wisdom) in ‘Other Minds', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , Supplementary Volume XX, reprinted in Austin's Philosophical Papers ; I refer to the pages in the latter publication. The question is raised again by the controversy between J. J. C. Smart and Kurt Baier about the status of pains and other sensations in A.J.P. , Vol. 40, No. 1, May, 1962.
Promising 1 A slightly revised version of a paper delivered as the Presidential Address to the Eight New Zealand Philosophy Conference in May, 1961
On justifying a metaethical theory 1 I am indebted to Mr. Fred Berger of the University of California and Dr. Douglas McGee of Vassar College for their critical comments on an earlier draft of this paper
Another look at counterfactuals
Definition by internal relation
David Armstrong and perception
Blackstone on metaethical neutrality
Is omniscience possible?
Notes and news