Two Notions of the Internal and Goldman's Epistemic Externalism

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In this Subject: Philosophy
By this author: Ziemi&#324;ska, Renata

Author: Ziemińska, Renata

Source: Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, Essays in Logic and Ontology. Edited by Jacek Malinowski and Andrzej Pietruszczak , pp. 395-400(6)

Publisher: Rodopi

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Abstract:

Two concepts of the internal should be distinguished in the current epistemic internalism/externalism debate: (1) the internal in an introspective sense as what is accessible by introspection and (2) the internal in a biological sense as what is inside the organism's nervous system. When "internal" is meant in the introspective sense, Goldman's process reliabilism is externalist, but when "internal" is taken in the biological sense, Goldman's process reliabilism is internalist. Goldman as a naturalist prefers "internal" in the biological sense, but the concept is unsuitable for presenting the current epistemic internalism/externalism controversy. If one understands "internal" in the introspective sense, Goldman's reliabilism is strongly externalist.

Document Type: Research article

Publication date: 2006-11-01