Narrowing Down Suspicion in Inconsistent Premise Sets

Author: Batens, Diderik

Source: Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, Essays in Logic and Ontology. Edited by Jacek Malinowski and Andrzej Pietruszczak , pp. 185-209(25)

Publisher: Rodopi

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Abstract:

Inconsistency-adaptive logics isolate the inconsistencies that are derivable from a premise set, and restrict the rules of Classical Logic only where inconsistencies are involved. From many inconsistent premise sets, disjunctions of contradictions are derivable no disjunct of which is itself derivable. Given such a disjunction, it is often justified to introduce new premises that state, with a certain degree of confidence, that some of the disjuncts are false. This is an important first step on the road to consistency: it narrows down suspicion in inconsistent premise sets and hence locates the real problems among the possible ones. In this paper I present two approaches for handling such new premises in the context of the original premises. The first approach may apparently be combined with all paraconsistent logics. The second approach does not have the same generality, but is decidedly more elegant.

Document Type: Research article

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