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Warum Wissen nicht der Allgemeinste Faktive Mentale Zustand ist

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In Knowledge and its Limits (2000) Williamson defends not only the negative claim that knowledge cannot be analysed, but also the positive claim that knowledge is the most general factive mental state. In this paper two objections to the positive claim are presented: First, knowledge is not more general than e. g. seeing. After discussing several alleged examples of seeing without knowing a new example is offered. Although both seeing and knowing are incompatible with luck, they are incompatible with different kinds of luck. Secondly, factive mental states that are more general than knowledge are conceivable. Williamson's characterisation of knowledge as being the most general factive mental state is not substantial enough to pick out exactly one state. The idea that there is such a thing as a maximal factive mental state cannot be sustained merely on the assumption that knowledge is unanalysable.

Language: German

Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: August 1, 2011

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