@article {Wiggins:2011-07-01T00:00:00:0165-9227:315,
author = "Wiggins, David",
title = "Platonism and the Argument from Causality",
journal = "Grazer Philosophische Studien",
volume = "82",
number = "1",
year = "2011-07-01T00:00:00",
abstract = "The paper argues that the causal argument urged by Benacerraf and others against mathematical Platonism misuses the truth that lurks behind the causal theory of knowing—a theory which the paper traces back to Charles Sanders Peirce's account of the fixation of belief. Once we
see (as Peirce himself came to see) that the essential insight of that theory relates not to causation but to the determination of belief and to rational vindication—of which mathematical proof is a special case—it becomes plain that the proper place to interrogate and refine Platonism
lies not within general metaphysics but within mathematical philosophy. There is no sensible separation to be made between (1) the train of thought which at once explains and vindicates our collective belief in a given mathematical proposition; (2) the sense that we attach to the proposition
which commands our collective assent; and (3) the account that is to be given of what the proposition with that sense is about—the objects which Quine's ontological criterion suggests we commit ourselves to in embracing the proof of the proposition thus understood.",
pages = "315-328",
url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/rodopi/gps/2011/00000082/00000001/art00014"
}