Reconsidering Closure, Underdetermination, and Infallibilism

Author: Briesen, Jochen

Source: Grazer Philosophische Studien, GEGRÜNDET VON Rudolf Haller HERAUSGEGEBEN VON Johannes L. Brandl, Marian David, Maria E. Reicher and Leopold Stubenberg , pp. 221-236(16)

Publisher: Rodopi

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Abstract:

Anthony Brueckner (1994, 2005) argues for a strong connection between the closure and the underdetermination argument for scepticism. Moreover, he claims that both arguments rest on infallibilism: In order to motivate the premises of the arguments, the sceptic has to refer to an infallibility principle. If this were true, fallibilists would be right in not taking the problems posed by these sceptical arguments seriously. As many epistemologists are sympathetic to fallibilism, this would be a very interesting result. However, in this paper I will argue that Brueckner's claims are wrong: The closure and the underdetermination argument are not as closely related as he assumes and neither rests on infallibilism. Thus even a fallibilist should take these arguments to raise serious problems that must be dealt with somehow.

Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: March 1, 2010

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