The Evolutionary and Social Preference For Knowledge: How to Solve Meno's Problem Within Reliabilism

Author: Werning, Markus

Source: Grazer Philosophische Studien, Reliable Knowledge and Social Epistemology. Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Goldman and Replies by Goldman , pp. 137-156(20)

Publisher: Rodopi

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Abstract:

This paper addresses various solutions to Meno's Problem: Why is it that knowledge is more valuable than merely true belief? Given both a pragmatist as well as a veritist understanding of epistemic value, it is argued that a reliabilist analysis of knowledge, in general, promises a hopeful strategy to explain the extra value of knowledge. It is, however, shown that two recent attempts to solve Meno's Problem within reliabilism are severely flawed: Olsson's conditional probability solution and Goldman's value autonomization solution. The paper proceeds with a discussion of the purpose of having a higher value of knowledge as opposed to merely true belief, both in evolutionary and social terms. It claims that under a reliabilist analysis of knowledge it can be explained how knowers could evolve rather than just truthful believers. Subsequently, the paper develops an account of how we can manipulate our testimonial environment in an epistemically beneficial way by valuing reliably produced true belief more that just true belief and so gives an indirect justification of the extra value of knowledge.

Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: December 1, 2009

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