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Justification-Affording Arguments and Corresponding Conditionals

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Intuitions about arguments are an important source of evidence in epistemology. In this paper, I consider a principle defended recently: (JCC) Necessarily, an argument P therefore C is justification-affording for subject S only if S justifiably believes that if P, then C. Cling (2003) presents an argument for (JCC). (JCC) is important because its truth is inconsistent with many plausible epistemological theories, including standard reliabilism and even some forms of internalist foundationalism. I will argue that non-skeptical epistemologists should find Cling's argument unconvincing. Further, I will briefly argue that (JCC) is false.

Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: 2009-05-01

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