Author: Schmechtig, Pedro

Source: Grazer Philosophische Studien, Grazer Philosophische Studien. Edited by Johannes L. Brandl, Marian David, Maria E. Reicher, Leopold Stubenberg , pp. 131-157(27)

Publisher: Rodopi

Abstract:

Presentists typically assent to the view that only present things exist, but there is an argument that this standpoint is not compatible with so-called 'cross-time' relations. I firstly explain what the argument in question consists in and, after that, discuss some weaknesses of different variants of the presentist standard defence. To defend presentism, I want to argue, it is better to introduce genuine tensed relations. It turns out that this approach presupposes an idea of a present existence which requires a two-dimensional, dynamic conception of time.

Document Type: Research article

Publication date: 2009-05-01

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