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An Alternative Account of Epistemic Reasons for Action: In Response to Booth

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Abstract:

In a recent contribution to Grazer Philosophische Studien, Booth argues that for S to have an epistemic reason to  means that if S 's then he will have more true beliefs and less false beliefs than if he does not . After strengthening this external account in response to the objection that one can improve one's epistemic state in other fashions, e.g. by having a gain in true beliefs which outweighs one's gain in false beliefs, I provide a challenge to it. My main objection, which I advance with the aid of several examples, is that such epistemic reasons could not motivate any action whatsoever. I close by developing an alternative account, which avoids this problem by appeal to internal considerations.

Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: August 1, 2008

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