Fregean Propositions, Belief Preservation and Cognitive Value

Author: Ruffino, Marco

Source: Grazer Philosophische Studien, Essays on Frege's Conception of Truth Edited by Dirk Greimann , pp. 217-236(20)

Publisher: Rodopi

Buy & download fulltext article:


Price: $20.00 plus tax (Refund Policy)


In this paper I argue indirectly for Frege's semantics, in particular for his conception of propositions, by reviewing some difficulties faced by one of the main contemporary alternative approaches, i.e., the direct reference theory. While Frege's semantics can yield an explanation of cognitive value and belief-preservation, the alternative approach seems to run into trouble here. I shall also briefly consider the question of whether epistemic issues should be of any concern for semantics, i.e., whether the feature mentioned above should really be regarded as an advantage of Frege's theory.

Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: August 1, 2007

Related content



Free Content
Free content
New Content
New content
Open Access Content
Open access content
Subscribed Content
Subscribed content
Free Trial Content
Free trial content

Text size:

A | A | A | A
Share this item with others: These icons link to social bookmarking sites where readers can share and discover new web pages. print icon Print this page