Transcendental Arguments: a Plea for Modesty
Author: Stern, Robert
Source: Grazer Philosophische Studien, Philosophical Knowledge. Edited by Christian Beyer and Alex Burri , pp. 143-161(19)
Publisher: Rodopi
Abstract:
A modest transcendental argument is one that sets out merely to establish how things need to appear to us or how we need to believe them to be, rather than how things are. Stroud's claim to have established that all transcendental arguments must be modest in this way is criticised and rejected. However, a different case for why we should abandon ambitious transcendental arguments is presented: namely, that when it comes to establishing claims about how things are, there is no reason to prefer transcendental arguments to arguments that rely on the evidence of the senses, making the former redundant in a way that modest transcendental arguments, which have a different kind of sceptical target, are not.Document Type: Research article
Publication date: 2007-06-01
- In this: publication
- By this: publisher
- In this Subject: Philosophy
- By this author: Stern, Robert

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