Philosophical Intuitions: Their Target, Their Source, and Their Epistemic Status
Author: Goldman, Alvin I.
Source: Grazer Philosophische Studien, Philosophical Knowledge. Edited by Christian Beyer and Alex Burri , pp. 1-26(26)
Publisher: Rodopi
Abstract:
Intuitions play a critical role in analytical philosophical activity. But do they qualify as genuine evidence for the sorts of conclusions philosophers seek? Skeptical arguments against intuitions are reviewed, and a variety of ways of trying to legitimate them are considered. A defense is offered of their evidential status by showing how their evidential status can be embedded in a naturalistic framework.Document Type: Research article
Publication date: 2007-06-01
- In this: publication
- By this: publisher
- In this Subject: Philosophy
- By this author: Goldman, Alvin I.

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