Philosophical Intuitions: Their Target, Their Source, and Their Epistemic Status

Author: Goldman, Alvin I.

Source: Grazer Philosophische Studien, Philosophical Knowledge. Edited by Christian Beyer and Alex Burri , pp. 1-26(26)

Publisher: Rodopi

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Abstract:

Intuitions play a critical role in analytical philosophical activity. But do they qualify as genuine evidence for the sorts of conclusions philosophers seek? Skeptical arguments against intuitions are reviewed, and a variety of ways of trying to legitimate them are considered. A defense is offered of their evidential status by showing how their evidential status can be embedded in a naturalistic framework.

Document Type: Research article

Publication date: 2007-06-01

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