Author: Sauer, Werner

Source: Grazer Philosophische Studien, Grazer Philosophische Studien. Edited by Johannes L. Brandl and Marian David and Leopold Stubenberg , pp. 1-26(26)

Publisher: Rodopi

Abstract:

The objective of this paper is to refute the widely held view that in the wake of his so-called reistic turn Brentano subjected his notion of intentionality to a deep-going revision, viz., that he turned from an ontological account of the intentional object by way of identifying it with the thought-of-thing, i.e., the intentional correlate, or by way of attributing to it a peculiar sort of existence, to a non-ontological account thereof. It will be shown that neither the pre-reistic Brentano espoused anything of an ontological account of the intentional object in that he both distinguished it sharply from the intentional correlate and definitely rejected the idea of there being different sorts of existence, and it will be argued that the apparently ineradicable inclination to ascribe to the pre-reistic Brentano an ontological account of the intentional object stems from ignoring the Aristotelian background of Brentano's thinking about relations.

Document Type: Research article

Publication date: 2006-04-01

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