How to Get a Non-intensionalist, Propositional, Moderately Realist Truthconditional Account Of Internal Metafictional Sentences
Author: Voltolini, Alberto
Source: Grazer Philosophische Studien, Propositions. Edited by Massimiliano Carrara and Elisabetta Sacchi , pp. 179-199(21)
Abstract:In what follows, I will first try to show that both anti-realist and realist intensionalist truthconditional accounts of internal metafictional sentences (i.e., sentences of the form "in the story S, p") are unsatisfactory. Moreover, I will claim that this does not mean that propositional truthconditional accounts of those sentences are to be dispensed with; simply, one has to provide a non-intensionalist propositional truthconditional account of those sentences. Finally, I will show that this account is fully compatible with a realist interpretation of those sentences' truthconditions according to which at least some of those sentences commit one to fictional entities.
Document Type: Research Article
Publication date: 2006-01-01