True in a Sense

Author: Iacona, Andrea

Source: Grazer Philosophische Studien, Propositions. Edited by Massimiliano Carrara and Elisabetta Sacchi , pp. 141-154(14)

Publisher: Rodopi

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Abstract:

The aim of this paper is to show that in order to make sense of the ascription of truth and falsity to the things we say it is essential to acknowledge a divergence between two basic intuitions. According to one of them it is plausible to talk of what is said as what the speaker has in mind. According to the other it is plausible to talk of what is said as the bearer of truth or falsity. The paper presents three cases in which these two intuitions seem not to coincide, and shows how this lack of coincidence can be accounted for in terms of underspecification.

Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: January 1, 2006

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