Living Without Closure

Author: Lawlor, Krista

Source: Grazer Philosophische Studien, Epistemological Contextualism. Edited by Martijn Blaauw , pp. 25-50(26)

Publisher: Rodopi

Buy & download fulltext article:

OR

Price: $20.00 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

Epistemic closure, the idea that knowledge is closed under known implication, plays a central role in current discussions of skepticism and the semantics of knowledge reports. Contextualists in particular rely heavily on the truth of epistemic closure in staking out their distinctive response to the so-called "skeptical paradox." I argue that contextualists should re-think their commitment to closure. Closure principles strong enough to force the skeptical paradox on us are too strong, and closure principles weak enough to express unobjectionable epistemic principles are too weak to generate the skeptical paradox. I briefly consider how the contextualist might live without (strong) closure.

Document Type: Research Article

Publication date: July 1, 2005

Related content

Tools

Key

Free Content
Free content
New Content
New content
Open Access Content
Open access content
Subscribed Content
Subscribed content
Free Trial Content
Free trial content

Text size:

A | A | A | A
Share this item with others: These icons link to social bookmarking sites where readers can share and discover new web pages. print icon Print this page