Nonconceptual Contents vs Nonconceptual States

Author: Daniel Laurier

Source: Grazer Philosophische Studien, Edited by Johannes L. Brandl, Marian David and Leopold Stubenberg , pp. 23-43(21)

Publisher: Rodopi

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Abstract:

The question to be discussed is whether the distinction between the conceptual and the nonconceptual is best understood as pertaining primarily to intentional contents or to intentional states or attitudes. Some authors have suggested that it must be understood in the second way, in order to make the claim that experiences are nonconceptual compatible with the idea that one can also believe what one experiences. I argue that there is no need to do so, and that a conceptual content can be understood as being simply one which is composed of concepts, without compromising this intuitive view of the relation between beliefs and experiences.

Document Type: Research article

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