Is Type Identity Incompatible with Multiple Realization?

Author: Michael Pauen

Source: Grazer Philosophische Studien, Mental Causation, Multiple Realization, and Emergence. Guest Editors: Marc Slors and Sven Walter , pp. 37-49(13)

Publisher: Rodopi

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Abstract:

It is commonly believed that there is a fundamental incompatibility between multiple realization and type identity in the philosophy of mind. This claim can be challenged, however, since a single neural type may be realized by different microphysical types. In this case, the identity statement would connect the psychological and the neural type, while the neural type, in turn, could be multiply realized by different microphysical types. Such a multiple realization of higher level types occurs quite frequently even within physics and it should be acceptable for physicalism in general.

Document Type: Research article

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