The Relevance of Moral Disagreement. Some Worries about Nondescriptivist Cognitivism

Author: Josep E. Corbí

Source: Grazer Philosophische Studien, Essays on the Philosophy of Terence Horgan. Edited by Johannes L. Brandl and Olga Markic , pp. 217-233(17)

Publisher: Rodopi

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Abstract:

Nondescriptivist Cognitivism vindicates the cognitive value of moral judgements despite their lack of descriptive content. In this paper,I raise a few worries about the proclaimed virtues of this new metaethical framework Firstly, I argue that Nondescriptivist Cognitivism tends to beg the question against descriptivism and, secondly, discuss Horgan and Timmons' case against Michael Smith's metaethical rationalism. Although I sympathise with their main critical claims against the latter, I am less enthusiastic about the arguments that they provide to support them.

Document Type: Research article

Publication date: 2002-06-01