Hamstrung or properly calibrated? Federalism and the appropriate role of government in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley world

Author: Clark, Michael E1

Source: International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Volume 1, Number 4, 1 October 2004 , pp. 385-412(28)

Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan

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Abstract:

Many events that preceded the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 are now well known. Congress rushed to enact Sarbanes-Oxley to counter a growing crisis of confidence about the integrity of the US financial marketplace. The first section of this paper re-examines some of the preceding events and issues that led Congress to enact this broad legislation. The second section then examines some problematic federalism issues raised by the legislation. The third section discusses some of the new white collar crime provisions enacted by Sarbanes-Oxley, as well as Congress's mandate for the US Sentencing Commission to increase the punishment for key white collar offences.International Journal of Disclosure and Governance (2004) 1, 385-412; doi:10.1057/palgrave.jdg.2040038

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1057/palgrave.jdg.2040038

Affiliations: 1: 1Partner, Hamel Bowers and Clark LLP, 5300 Memorial Drive, Suite 900, Houston, Texas 77007, USA;, Tel: +1 713 869 0557, Fax: +1 713 869 0677, Email: mclark@hbc-trial-law.com

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