Enforcement and Good Corporate Governance in Developing Countries and Transition Economies

Authors: Berglöf, Erik; Claessens, Stijn

Source: World Bank Research Observer, Volume 21, Number 1, 2006 , pp. 123-150(28)

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Abstract:

More than regulations, laws on the books, or voluntary codes, enforcement is key to creating an effective business environment and good corporate governance, at least in developing countries and transition economies. A framework is presented to help explain enforcement, the impact on corporate governance when rules are not enforced, and what can be done to improve corporate governance in weak enforcement environments. The limited empirical evidence suggests that private enforcement tools are often more effective than public tools. However, some public enforcement is necessary, and private enforcement mechanisms often require public laws to function. Private initiatives are often also taken under the threat of legislation or regulation, although in some countries bottom-up, private-led initiatives preceded and even shaped public laws. Concentrated ownership aligns incentives and encourages monitoring, but it weakens other corporate governance mechanisms and can impose significant costs. Various steps can be taken to reduce these costs and reinforce other corporate governance mechanisms. But political economy constraints, resulting from the intermingling of business and politics, often prevent improvements in the enforcement environment and the adoption and implementation of public laws.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/wbro/lkj005

Publication date: 2006-01-01

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The World Bank Research Observer seeks to inform nonspecialist readers about research being undertaken within the Bank and outside the Bank in areas of economics relevant for development policy. Requiring only a minimal background in economic analysis, its surveys and overviews of key issues in development economics research are intended for policymakers, project officers, journalists keeping up to date, and teachers and students of development economics and related disciplines. Papers for the Observer are not sent out to referees, but all articles published are assessed and approved by the Editorial Board, which includes three to four distinguished economists from outside the Bank. The Observer has nearly 1,500 subscribers in OECD countries and nearly 10,000 subscribers in developing countries.

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Enforcement and Good Corporate Governance in Developing Countries and Transition Economies

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