Social Investment Funds: An Organizational Approach to Improved Development Assistance
Source: World Bank Research Observer, Volume 16, Number 1, 01 February 2001 , pp. 109-124(16)
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Abstract:
This paper examines the design of social investment funds (sifs) and explores the ways they affect agents' incentives to propose, select, and implement good projects. Compared with other forms of decentralized service provision, sifs possess features of administratively delegated authority and deep political devolution. Where existing political institutions fail to deliver assistance to vulnerable groups, a well-designed sif may represent a useful administrative alternative. This article reviews several features that provide incentives for both sif staff and project beneficiaries and concludes with practical guidelines for designing and appraising social investment funds.Document Type: Research article
Publication date: 2001-02-01
- The World Bank Research Observer seeks to inform nonspecialist readers about research being undertaken within the Bank and outside the Bank in areas of economics relevant for development policy. Requiring only a minimal background in economic analysis, its surveys and overviews of key issues in development economics research are intended for policymakers, project officers, journalists keeping up to date, and teachers and students of development economics and related disciplines. Papers for the Observer are not sent out to referees, but all articles published are assessed and approved by the Editorial Board, which includes three to four distinguished economists from outside the Bank. The Observer has nearly 1,500 subscribers in OECD countries and nearly 10,000 subscribers in developing countries.
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