Particularism around the World

Authors: Wallack J.S.; Gaviria A.; Panizza U.; Stein E.

Source: World Bank Economic Review, Volume 17, Number 1, June 2003 , pp. 133-143(11)

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Abstract:

This article presents a new data set on electoral systems and outlines its potential uses in research on the links between electoral systems and economic outcomes. The data measure the extent to which politicians can advance their careers by appealing to narrow geographic constituencies on the one hand or party constituencies on the other.

Document Type: Original article

Affiliations: Jessica Seddon Wallack is a graduate student in political economics in the Graduate School of Business at Stanford University; her e-mail address is jseddon@stanford.edu. Alejandro Gaviria is Deputy Director of the Planning Department, Colombia at Fe

Publication date: 2003-06-01

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