Can Managerial Discretion Explain Observed Leverage Ratios?

Author: Morellec E.

Source: Review of Financial Studies, Volume 17, Number 1, 2004 , pp. 257-294(38)

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Abstract:

This article analyzes the impact of managerial discretion and corporate control mechanisms on leverage and firm value within a contingent claims model where the manager derives perquisites from investment. Optimal capital structure reflects both the tax advantage of debt less bankruptcy costs and the agency costs of managerial discretion. Actual capital structure reflects the trade-off made by the manager between his empire-building desires and the need to ensure sufficient efficiency to prevent control challenges. The model shows that manager-shareholder conflicts can explain the low debt levels observed in practice. It also examines the impact of these conflicts on the cross-sectional variation in capital structures.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhg036

Publication date: 2004-01-01

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The Review of Financial Studies is a major forum for the promotion and wide dissemination of significant new research in financial economics. As reflected by its broadly based editorial board, the Review balances theoretical and empirical contributions. The primary criteria for publishing a paper are its quality and importance to the field of finance, without undue regard to its technical difficulty. Finance is interpreted broadly to include the interface between finance and economics. The Review is sponsored by The Society for Financial Studies. The editors of the Review and officers of the Society are elected for limited terms.