The Role of Trading Halts in Monitoring a Specialist Market

Authors: Edelen R.; Gervais S.

Source: Review of Financial Studies, Volume 16, Number 1, 2003 , pp. 263-300(38)

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Abstract:

When a collection of specialists organize as an exchange, each can reap net private benefits at the expense of the exchange by quoting a privately optimal pricing schedule. Coordination makes all specialists and customers better off, but requires a system of monitoring and punishment that breaks down when information asymmetries between the exchange and a specialist are high. The specialist may then seek a temporary trading halt to alleviate unjustified punishment, or the exchange may halt trading to prevent the quoting of damaging privately optimal pricing schedules. We test this theory on a sample of NYSE halts. As predicted, we find a significant increase in estimated information asymmetry immediately preceding trading halts.

Document Type: Research article

Publication date: 2003-01-01

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The Review of Financial Studies is a major forum for the promotion and wide dissemination of significant new research in financial economics. As reflected by its broadly based editorial board, the Review balances theoretical and empirical contributions. The primary criteria for publishing a paper are its quality and importance to the field of finance, without undue regard to its technical difficulty. Finance is interpreted broadly to include the interface between finance and economics. The Review is sponsored by The Society for Financial Studies. The editors of the Review and officers of the Society are elected for limited terms.