Author: Harker, David

Source: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Volume 64, Number 1, 13 March 2013 , pp. 79-106(28)

Publisher: Oxford University Press

Abstract:

The most influential arguments for scientific realism remain centrally concerned with an inference from scientific success to the approximate truth of successful theories. Recently, however, and in response to antirealists' objections from radical discontinuity within the history of science, the arguments have been refined. Rather than target entire theories, realists narrow their commitments to only certain parts of theories. Despite an initial plausibility, the selective realist strategy faces significant challenges. In this article, I outline four prerequisites for a successful selective realist defence and argue that adopting a comparative sense of success both satisfies those requirements and partially in consequence provides a more compelling, albeit more modest, realist thesis. <list list-type="simple">

1Introduction

2Requisites for a Selective Realist Defence

3Success, Progress, and a New Selective Realist Thesis<list list-type="simple">

3.1A new way for realists to think about scientific success

3.2Distinguishing two realist commitments

3.3A new selective realist thesis

3.4For convergence and against relying on explanatory virtues

4Requisites for a Selective Realist Defence Revisited

5Historical Sketches<list list-type="simple">

5.1Optical aether theories

5.2Phlogiston theory

5.3Darwin, Galton, and Weissmann on generation and inheritance

5.4Stability across theory change

6Conclusions

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axr059

Publication date: 2013-03-13

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• For over fifty years The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science has published the best international work in the philosophy of science under a distinguished list of editors including A. C. Crombie, Mary Hesse, Imre Lakatos, D. H. Mellor and David Papineau.

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