Criteria of Identity: Strong and Wrong
Author: Leitgeb, Hannes
Source: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Volume 64, Number 1, 13 March 2013 , pp. 61-68(8)
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Abstract:We show that finitely axiomatized first-order theories that involve some criterion of identity for entities of a category C can be reformulated as conjunctions of a non-triviality statement and a criterion of identity for entities of category C again. From this, we draw two conclusions: First, criteria of identity can be very strong deductively. Second, although the criteria of identity that are constructed in the proof of the theorem are not good ones intuitively, it is difficult to say what exactly is wrong with them once the modern metaphysical view of identity criteria is presupposed.
1 Criteria of Identity: Strong
2 and Wrong
Document Type: Research Article
Publication date: 2013-03-13
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