Is Understanding A Species Of Knowledge?

Author: Grimm, Stephen R.

Source: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Volume 57, Number 3, September 2006 , pp. 515-535(21)

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Abstract:

Among philosophers of science there seems to be a general consensus that understanding represents a species of knowledge, but virtually every major epistemologist who has thought seriously about understanding has come to deny this claim. Against this prevailing tide in epistemology, I argue that understanding is, in fact, a species of knowledge: just like knowledge, for example, understanding is not transparent and can be Gettiered. I then consider how the psychological act of “grasping” that seems to be characteristic of understanding differs from the sort of psychological act that often characterizes knowledge. <LIST> <ITEM>

Zagzebski's account </ITEM> <ITEM>

Kvanvig's account </ITEM> <ITEM>

Two problems </ITEM> <ITEM>

Comanche cases </ITEM> <ITEM>

Unreliable sources of information </ITEM> <ITEM>

The upper-right quadrant </ITEM> <ITEM>

So is understanding a species of knowledge? </ITEM> <ITEM>

A false choice </ITEM></LIST>

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axl015

Publication date: 2006-09-01

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For over fifty years The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science has published the best international work in the philosophy of science under a distinguished list of editors including A. C. Crombie, Mary Hesse, Imre Lakatos, D. H. Mellor and David Papineau.