Intuitions In Linguistics

Author: Devitt, Michael

Source: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Volume 57, Number 3, September 2006 , pp. 481-513(33)

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Abstract:

Linguists take the intuitive judgments of speakers to be good evidence for a grammar. Why? The Chomskian answer is that they are derived by a rational process from a representation of linguistic rules in the language faculty. The paper takes a different view. It argues for a naturalistic and non-Cartesian view of intuitions in general. They are empirical central-processor responses to phenomena differing from other such responses only in being immediate and fairly unreflective. Applying this to linguistic intuitions yields an explanation of their evidential role without any appeal to the representation of rules. <LIST> <ITEM>

Introduction </ITEM> <ITEM>

The evidence for linguistic theories </ITEM> <ITEM>

A tension in the linguists' view of intuitions </ITEM> <ITEM>

Intuitions in general </ITEM> <ITEM>

Linguistic intuitions </ITEM> <ITEM>

Comparison of the modest explanation with the standard Cartesian explanation </ITEM> <ITEM>

A nonstandard Cartesian explanation of the role of intuitions? </ITEM> <ITEM>

Must linguistics explain intuitions? </ITEM> <ITEM>

Conclusion </ITEM></LIST>

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axl017

Publication date: 2006-09-01

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