Causality and Temporal Order in Special Relativity

Author: Ben-Yami, Hanoch

Source: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Volume 57, Number 3, September 2006 , pp. 459-479(21)

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Abstract:

David Malament tried to show that the causal theory of time leads to a unique determination of simultaneity relative to an inertial observer, namely standard simultaneity. I show that the causal relation Malament uses in his proofs, causal connectibility, should be replaced by a different causal relation, the one used by Reichenbach in his formulation of the theory. I also explain why Malament's reliance on the assumption that the observer has an eternal inertial history modifies our conception of simultaneity, and I therefore eliminate it. Having made these changes, Malament's uniqueness result no longer follows, although the conventionality of simultaneity is not reinstated. I contrast my approach with previous criticisms of Malament. <LIST> <ITEM>

Introduction </ITEM> <ITEM>

Causality and Temporal Order </ITEM> <ITEM>

Malament's Argument </ITEM> <ITEM>

Causality versus Causal Connectibility </ITEM> <ITEM>

Simultaneity and History </ITEM> <ITEM>

Conclusion </ITEM></LIST>

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axl019

Publication date: 2006-09-01

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