Some Considerations on Conditional Chances
Author: Humphreys, Paul
Source: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Volume 55, Number 4, December 2004 , pp. 667-680(14)
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Abstract:Four interpretations of single-case conditional propensities are described and it is shown that for each a version of what has been called ‘Humphreys' Paradox’ remains, despite the clarifying work of Gillies, McCurdy and Miller. This entails that propensities cannot be a satisfactory interpretation of standard probability theory.
The basic issue
The formal paradox
Values of conditional propensities
Interpretations of propensities
8.1 Temporal evolution
8.3 Causal influence
Propensities to generate frequencies
Document Type: Research Article
Publication date: December 2004
- For over fifty years The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science has published the best international work in the philosophy of science under a distinguished list of editors including A. C. Crombie, Mary Hesse, Imre Lakatos, D. H. Mellor and David Papineau.