Hempel's Raven Paradox: A Lacuna in the Standard Bayesian Solution

Author: Vranas, Peter B. M.

Source: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Volume 55, Number 3, September 2004 , pp. 545-560(16)

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Abstract:

According to Hempel's paradox, evidence (E) that an object is a nonblack nonraven confirms the hypothesis (H) that every raven is black. According to the standard Bayesian solution, E does confirm H but only to a minute degree. This solution relies on the almost never explicitly defended assumption that the probability of H should not be affected by evidence that an object is nonblack. I argue that this assumption is implausible, and I propose a way out for Bayesians.

Introduction

Hempel's paradox, the standard Bayesian solution, and the disputed assumption

Attempts to defend the disputed assumption

Attempts to refute the disputed assumption

A way out for Bayesians

Conclusion

Document Type: Research article

Publication date: 2004-09-01

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