Prolegomenon To Any Future Neo-Logicist Set Theory: Abstraction And Indefinite Extensibility

Author: Shapiro S.

Source: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Volume 54, Number 1, March 2003 , pp. 59-91(33)

Publisher: Oxford University Press

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Abstract:

The purpose of this paper is to assess the prospects for a neo-logicist development of set theory based on a restriction of Frege's Basic Law V, which we call (RV): forallPforallQ[Ext(P) = Ext(Q) equiv [(BAD(P) & BAD(Q)) or forallx(Px equiv Qx)]] BAD is taken as a primitive property of properties. We explore the features it must have for (RV) to sanction the various strong axioms of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory. The primary interpretation is where ‘BAD’ is Dummett's ‘indefinitely extensible’.

1 Background: what and why?

2 Framework

3 GOOD candidates, indefinite extensibility

4 The framework of (RV) alone, or almost alone

5 The axioms

6 Brief closing

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/54.1.59

Publication date: 2003-03-01

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  • For over fifty years The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science has published the best international work in the philosophy of science under a distinguished list of editors including A. C. Crombie, Mary Hesse, Imre Lakatos, D. H. Mellor and David Papineau.
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