Nature and Nurture in Cognition
Author: Khalidi M.A.
Source: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Volume 53, Number 2, June 2002 , pp. 251-272(22)
Publisher: Oxford University Press
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Abstract:
This paper advocates a dispositional account of innate cognitive capacities, which has an illustrious history from Plato to Chomsky. The triggering model of innateness, first made explicit by Stich ([1975]), explicates the notion in terms of the relative informational content of the stimulus (input) and the competence (output). The advantage of this model of innateness is that it does not make a problematic reference to normal conditions and avoids relativizing innate traits to specific populations, as biological models of innateness are forced to do. Relativization can be avoided in the case of cognitive capacities precisely because informational content is involved. Even though one cannot measure output relative to input in a precise way, there are indirect and approximate ways of assessing the degree of innateness of a specific cognitive capacity.1 Introduction2 Two models of innateness3 Discarding the disease model4 Impoverishment and implasticity5 Measuring poverty6 Assessing innateness<?Pub Caret>Document Type: Research article
DOI: 10.1093/bjps/53.2.251
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