What Perception Is Doing, and What it Is Not Doing, in Mathematical Reasoning

Author: Lomas D.

Source: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Volume 53, Number 2, June 2002 , pp. 205-223(19)

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Abstract:

What is perception doing in mathematical reasoning? To address this question, I discuss the role of perception in geometric reasoning. Perception of the shape properties of concrete diagrams provides, I argue, a surrogate consciousness of the shape properties of the abstract geometric objects depicted in the diagrams. Some of what perception is not doing in mathematical reasoning is also discussed. I take issue with both Parsons and Maddy. Parsons claims that we perceive a certain type of abstract object. Maddy claims (at least at one time claimed) that perception provides the basis for intuition of mathematical sets.

1 Mathematical reasoning with diagrams

2 Do we perceive abstract objects?

3 Do we perceive mathematical sets?

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/53.2.205

Publication date: 2002-06-01

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