Venetian Sea Levels, British Bread Prices, and the Principle of the Common Cause

Source: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Volume 52, Number 2, June 2001 , pp. 331-346(16)

Publisher: Oxford University Press

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Abstract:

When two causally independent processes each have a quantity that increases monotonically (either deterministically or in probabilistic expectation), the two quantities will be correlated, thus providing a counterexample to Reichenbach's principle of the common cause. Several philosophers have denied this, but I argue that their efforts to save the principle are unsuccessful. Still, one salvage attempt does suggest a weaker principle that avoids the initial counterexample. However, even this weakened principle is mistaken, as can be seen by exploring the concepts of homology and homoplasy used in evolutionary biology. I argue that the kernel of truth in the principle of the common cause is to be found by separating metaphysical and epistemological issues; as far as the epistemology is concerned, the Likelihood Principle is central.

Document Type: Research article

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