Holes, Haecceitism and two conceptions of determinism
Author: Melia, J
Source: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Volume 50, Number 4, December 1999 , pp. 639-664(26)
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Abstract:In this paper I claim that Earman and Norton's hole argument against substantivalist interpretations of General Relativity assumes that the substantivalist must adopt a conception of determinism which I argue is unsatisfactory. Butterfield and others have responded to the hole argument by finding a conception of determinism open to the substantivalist that is not prone to the hole argument. But, unfortunately for the substantivalist, I argue this conception also turns out to be unsatisfactory. Accordingly, I search for a conception of determinism that is both independently plausible and capable of blocking the hole argument.
Document Type: Research Article
Publication date: 1999-12-01
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