The Possibility of Impartiality
Author: Lucy, William
Source: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Volume 25, Number 1, Spring 2005 , pp. 3-31(29)
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Abstract:This essay offers a general account of the idea of impartiality and examines the senses in which adjudication is and is not impartial. Against those who would derive an account of impartiality from more general moral or political theories, the essay shows that ordinary thought embodies a coherent and reasonably rich conception of impartiality, some of the principal features of which are also in play in adjudication. Against those who claim that impartiality in adjudication is impossible or illusory, it is argued that there are some meaningful senses in which adjudication is indeed impartial. The essay concludes that in the adjudicative context impartiality might even be considered a virtue, albeit a limited one.
Document Type: Research article
Publication date: 2005-03-01
- The Oxford Journal of Legal Studies is published on behalf of the Faculty of Law in the University of Oxford. It is designed to encourage interest in all matters relating to law, with an emphasis on matters of theory and on broad issues arising from the relationship of law to other disciplines. No topic of legal interest is excluded from consideration. In addition to traditional questions of legal interest, the following are all within the purview of the journal: comparative and international law, the law of the European Community, legal history and philosophy, and interdisciplinary material in areas of relevance.