Judges and Citizens: Two Conceptions of Law
Author: Eekelaar, J.
Source: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Volume 22, Number 3, Autumn 2002 , pp. 497-516(20)
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Abstract:This article argues that the apparent incompatibility between Social Theses about the nature of law and the Coherence (or Interpretivist) Thesis should be resolved by seeing them as representing two different conceptions of law. The Social Thesis associated with Exclusive Positivism is a powerful device for understanding the relationship between law and the citizen. But its central features, which turn on the authoritative nature of law, do not necessarily apply to the conception of law used by judges when deciding cases. Failure to recognize the concurrence of the two conceptions of law can conceal some important issues of justice.
Document Type: Original Article
Affiliations: Fellow of Pembroke College, Oxford
Publication date: Autumn 2002
- The Oxford Journal of Legal Studies is published on behalf of the Faculty of Law in the University of Oxford. It is designed to encourage interest in all matters relating to law, with an emphasis on matters of theory and on broad issues arising from the relationship of law to other disciplines. No topic of legal interest is excluded from consideration. In addition to traditional questions of legal interest, the following are all within the purview of the journal: comparative and international law, the law of the European Community, legal history and philosophy, and interdisciplinary material in areas of relevance.