The Truth Norm and Guidance: a Reply to Steglich-Petersen
Authors: Gler, Kathrin; Wikforss, sa
Source: Mind, Volume 119, Number 475, 15 July 2010 , pp. 757-761(5)
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Abstract:We have claimed that truth norms cannot provide genuine guidance for belief formation (Gler and Wikforss 2009, pp. 434). Asbjrn Steglich-Petersen argues that our no guidance argument fails because it conflates certain psychological states an agent must have in order to apply the truth norm with the condition under which the norm prescribes forming certain beliefs. We spell out the no guidance argument in more detail and show that there is no such conflation.
Document Type: Research article
Publication date: 2010-07-15
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