Wide or Narrow Scope?
Author: Broome, John
Source: Mind, Volume 116, Number 462, April 2007 , pp. 359-370(12)
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Abstract:This paper is a response to `Why Be Rational?' by Niko Kolodny. Kolodny argues that we have no reason to satisfy the requirements of rationality. His argument assumes that these requirements have a logically narrow scope. To see what the question of scope turns on, this comment provides a semantics for `requirement'. It shows that requirements of rationality have a wide scope, at least under one sense of `requirement'. Consequently Kolodny's conclusion cannot be derived.
Document Type: Research article
Publication date: 2007-04-01
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