Quantifiers and Temporal Ontology

Author: Sider, Theodore

Source: Mind, Volume 115, Number 457, January 2006 , pp. 75-97(23)

Buy & download fulltext article:

Price: $44.11 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

Eternalists say that non-present entities (for instance dinosaurs) exist; presentists say that they do not. But some sceptics deny that this debate is genuine, claiming that presentists simply represent eternalists' quantifiers over non-present entities in different notation. This scepticism may be refuted on purely logical grounds: one of the leading candidate `presentist quantifiers' over non-present things has the inferential role of a quantifier. The dispute over whether non-present objects exist is as genuine and non-verbal as the dispute over whether there is life on other planets.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzl075

Publication date: 2006-01-01

More about this publication?

Mind has long been a leading journal in philosophy. For well over 100 years it has presented the best of cutting edge thought from epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mind. Mind continues its tradition of excellence today. Mind has always enjoyed a strong reputation for the high standards established by its editors and receives around 350 submissions each year. The editor seeks advice from a large number of expert referees, including members of the network of Associate Editors and his international advisers. Mind is published quarterly.