Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for Biological Approaches to Personal Identity?

Author: Hershenov, David

Source: Mind, Volume 114, Number 453, 1 January 2005 , pp. 31-59(29)

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Abstract:

Part of the appeal of the biological approach to personal identity is that it does not have to countenance spatially coincident entities. But if the termination thesis is correct and the organism ceases to exist at death, then it appears that the corpse is a dead body that earlier was a living body and distinct from but spatially coincident with the organism. If the organism is identified with the body, then the unwelcome spatial coincidence could perhaps be avoided. It is argued that such an identification would be a mistake. A living organism has a different part/whole relationship and persistence conditions than the alleged body. A case will be made that the concept ‘human body’ is a conceptual mess, vague in an unprincipled manner, and that an eliminativist stance towards dead bodies is the appropriate response.

Keywords: antitumor vaccination; gene therapy; melanoma; phase I/II trial; renal cell carcinoma

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzi031

Publication date: 2005-01-01

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Mind has long been a leading journal in philosophy. For well over 100 years it has presented the best of cutting edge thought from epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mind. Mind continues its tradition of excellence today. Mind has always enjoyed a strong reputation for the high standards established by its editors and receives around 350 submissions each year. The editor seeks advice from a large number of expert referees, including members of the network of Associate Editors and his international advisers. Mind is published quarterly.