Counterparts and Actuality

Authors: Fara, Michael1; Williamson, Timothy2

Source: Mind, Volume 114, Number 453, 1 January 2005 , pp. 1-30(30)

Publisher: Oxford University Press

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Abstract:

Many philosophers, following David Lewis, believe that we should look to counterpart theory, not quantified modal logic, as a means of understanding modal discourse. We argue that this is a mistake. Significant parts of modal discourse involve either implicit or explicit reference to what is actually the case, raising the question of how talk about actuality is to be represented counterpart-theoretically. By considering possible modifications of Lewis's counterpart theory, including actual modifications due to Graeme Forbes and Murali Ramachandran, we argue that no coherent version of counterpart theory can provide a plausible representation of talk about actuality, and so, we conclude, counterpart theory should be rejected.

Keywords: antitumor vaccination; gene therapy; melanoma; phase I/II trial; renal cell carcinoma

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzi001

Affiliations: 1: Sage School of Philosophy, 218 Goldwin Smith Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA , Email: michael.fara@cornell.edu 2: New College, Oxford OX1 3BN, UK, Email: timothy.williamson@philosophy.oxford.ac.uk

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