Counterparts and Actuality

Authors: Fara, Michael¹; Williamson, Timothy²

Source: Mind, Volume 114, Number 453, 1 January 2005 , pp. 1-30(30)

Buy & download fulltext article:

Price: $35.78 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

Many philosophers, following David Lewis, believe that we should look to counterpart theory, not quantified modal logic, as a means of understanding modal discourse. We argue that this is a mistake. Significant parts of modal discourse involve either implicit or explicit reference to what is actually the case, raising the question of how talk about actuality is to be represented counterpart-theoretically. By considering possible modifications of Lewis's counterpart theory, including actual modifications due to Graeme Forbes and Murali Ramachandran, we argue that no coherent version of counterpart theory can provide a plausible representation of talk about actuality, and so, we conclude, counterpart theory should be rejected.

Keywords: antitumor vaccination; gene therapy; melanoma; phase I/II trial; renal cell carcinoma

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzi001

Affiliations: 1: Sage School of Philosophy, 218 Goldwin Smith Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA , Email: michael.fara@cornell.edu 2: New College, Oxford OX1 3BN, UK, Email: timothy.williamson@philosophy.oxford.ac.uk

Publication date: 2005-01-01

More about this publication?

Mind has long been a leading journal in philosophy. For well over 100 years it has presented the best of cutting edge thought from epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mind. Mind continues its tradition of excellence today. Mind has always enjoyed a strong reputation for the high standards established by its editors and receives around 350 submissions each year. The editor seeks advice from a large number of expert referees, including members of the network of Associate Editors and his international advisers. Mind is published quarterly.