‘The general propositional form is a variable’ (Tractatus 4.53)

Author: Sullivan P.M.

Source: Mind, Volume 113, Number 449, January 2004 , pp. 43-56(14)

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Abstract:

Wittgenstein presents in the Tractatus a variable purporting to capture the general form of proposition. One understanding of what Wittgenstein is doing there, an understanding in line with the ‘new’ reading of his work championed by Diamond, Conant and others, sees it as a deflationary or even an implosive move—a move by which a concept sometimes put by philosophers to distinctively metaphysical use is replaced, in a perspicuous notation, by an innocent device of generalization, thereby dispersing the clouds of philosophy that formerly surrounded the concept. By asking how Wittgenstein supposed his variable to work, and what work he imagined it was fit for, the paper questions the adequacy of that understanding.

Document Type: Research article

Publication date: 2004-01-01

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Mind has long been a leading journal in philosophy. For well over 100 years it has presented the best of cutting edge thought from epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mind. Mind continues its tradition of excellence today. Mind has always enjoyed a strong reputation for the high standards established by its editors and receives around 350 submissions each year. The editor seeks advice from a large number of expert referees, including members of the network of Associate Editors and his international advisers. Mind is published quarterly.