The Non-Identity of a Material Thing and Its Matter

Author: Kit Fine

Source: Mind, Volume 112, Number 446, March 2003 , pp. 195-234(40)

Publisher: Oxford University Press

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Abstract:

There is a well-known argument from Leibniz's Law for the view that coincident material things may be distinct. For given that they differ in their properties, then how can they be the same? However, many philosophers have suggested that this apparent difference in properties is the product of a linguistic illusion; there is just one thing out there, but different sorts or guises under which it may be described. I attempt to show that this ‘opacity’ defence has intolerable consequences for the functioning of our language and that the original argument should therefore be allowed to stand.

Document Type: Research article

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