Phenomenal consciousness: the explanatory gap as a cognitive illusion
Author: Tye, M.
Source: Mind, Volume 108, Number 432, October 1999 , pp. 705-725(21)
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Abstract:The thesis that there is a troublesome explanatory gap between the phenomenal aspects of experiences and the underlying physical and functional states is given a number of different interpretations. It is shown that, on each of these interpretations, the thesis is false. In supposing otherwise, philosophers have fallen prey to a cognitive illusion, induced largely by a failure to recognize the special character of phenomenal concepts.
Document Type: Original Article
Affiliations: Philosophy Department, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA 19122, USA
Publication date: October 1999
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